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CASENOTE

CONTEMPT OF COURT-Right to Jury Trial-A Fine of
$104,000 and Thirty Day Jail Sentence is Serious Offense
Entitling Contemnor to Trial by Jury
Ex Parte Griffin,
682 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1984)
Don Griffin was temporarily enjoined from selling chemical products and
related goods, similar to NCH Corporation's products, to a specific list of
NCH customers in several Texas counties. 1 Griffin appealed the temporary
injunction, which the court of appeals affirmed.2 In its contempt motion,
NCH Corporation alleged that Griffin violated the temporary injunction on
multiple occasions and requested a $500 fine for each violation, as well as a
jail sentence of less than six months. 3 The trial court found Griffin to be in
contempt of court and sentenced him to thirty days in jail and a $104,000
fine. 4 While in custody, Griffin filed a habeas corpus petition seeking release
from jail, contending that a jury should have been present at the contempt
proceeding. 5 The Texas Supreme Court granted the writ of habeas corpus.6
Held-Griffin entitled to jury trial.7 A fine of $104,000 and thirty day jail
sentence is a serious offense entitling the contemnor to a trial by jury.'

1. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 261-62 (Tex. 1984). Griffin was also enjoined
from taking away or attempting to divert any of the customer accounts identified in a seven
page listing of the complainant's customers. See id. at 262.
2. See id. at 262. The temporary injunction was effective for two years from its date of
issuance, or until a final judgment was rendered based on a trial on the merits. See id. at 262.
3. See id. at 262. NCH Corporation alleged that Griffin sold chemical products to 25
customers listed on exhibit "A" attached to the temporary injunction. See id. at 262.
4. See id. at 262.
5. See id. at 262. Griffin contended the excessive amount of the fines made the offense
serious, thereby triggering his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. See id. at 262.
6. See id.at 262.
7. See id.at 262.
8. See id. at 262.
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Article III section 2' and the sixth amendment" ° of the United States
Constitution provide the constitutional basis for a trial by jury in criminal
proceedings.'1 The right to a jury trial is not automatically invoked for all
criminal proceedings, 2 because the common law exception for "petty" offenses has been adopted by the United States Supreme Court.13 Since the
adoption of the common law exception, courts have struggled with the determination of whether a particular offense is petty or serious,14 especially in
9. U. S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The third clause of § 2 provides, in the relevant part: "[T]he
trial of all crimes. . .shall be by jury." Id.
10. U. S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury ....
I Id.
11. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (sixth amendment right to jury trial
applies to serious crimes); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (right to jury trial
attaching to criminal offenses fundamental to prevent injustice). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court.-A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 231 (1971) (sixth amendment not applicable to civil cases).
12. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (noting difference between
petty and serious offenses; only latter entitled to jury trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
160 (1968) (petty offenses tried without jury in England and United States, despite seemingly
comprehensive language of sixth amendment); see also Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal
Offenses and the ConstitutionalGuaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REV. 917, 969 (1926)
(petty offense exception -to trial by jury requirement accepted practice in colonies and later in
states).
13. See, e.g., Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (prosecution of petty offense does not require jury trial); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937)
(right to jury trial does not apply to every criminal proceeding as petty offenses commonly
tried summarily); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (common law recognized class of
petty offenses in which jury trial was unnecessary). For a detailed analysis and review of the
historical basis for the petty offense exception, see generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty
FederalOffenses and the ConstitutionalGuarantyof Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 98081 (1926) (petty offenses not rigid category, but acts not deeply offending community morals,
resulting in relatively light punishment). But see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peersl, 26 U.
CHI. L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1959) (interpretation of constitutional right to jury trial espoused by
Frankfurter and Corcoran undesirable and unwarranted abrogation of clear right to trial by
jury in all criminal cases).
14. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975) (adopted federal definition of
petty offenses as to imprisonment, but refused to adopt it as to fines because two are inherently
different). Despite the Supreme Court's admonition in Muniz that fines and imprisonment are
intrinsically different, several lower courts have held that a fine in excess of $500 cannot be
imposed upon an individual without a jury trial, thus fully adopting the guidelines set forth in
the federal statute. See, e.g., United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980)
(federal statute supplies objective criteria in determination of seriousness of offense); United
States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting federal statutory standard for
determination of when fines become serious enough to necessitate jury trial); Douglass v. First
Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (federal statutory definition of petty offenses
provide guidance in this gray area). The federal statute referred to above delineates the objective guidelines to be used in the determination of whether an offense is petty or serious. See 18
U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983) (petty offense is any misdemeanor not carrying penalty of more than six
months or fine of more than $500).
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the area of contempt of court.1 5

Contempt of court has been defined as "an act of disobedience or disrespect toward a judicial. . . body, or interference with its orderly process, for
which a summary punishment is usually exacted." 1 6 Historically, a jury
trial was not deemed necessary for prosecution of criminal contempt. 7 The
question of whether criminal contempt was to be treated as any other criminal offense was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in Bloom v.
Illinois. 8 The Court held that the right to a jury trial applies only to cases
of "serious" criminal contempt.' 9 In order to determine if the contempt was

15. See Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (scope of contempt is broad,
from criminal to civil sanctions, causing confusion over whether jury trial necessary in all
cases); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 195 (1968) (question of whether state or federal courts
may try cases of contempt without jury is recurring one); see also R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 2-3 (1963) (American law recognizes individual liberties and rights, but they
must be curtailed when threaten order of courts and society in general). See generally Dobbs,
Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 233 (1971) (difficult questions raised
in determining when judgment for contempt serious enough to warrant jury trial).
16. See R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 1, 1 (1963) (contempt divided into many
categories which are governed respectively by particular procedures). There are three basic
classifications of contempt which must be decided before the appropriate procedures may be
applied. See id. at 48. The first determination a court usually faces is whether the contempt is
criminal or civil, based on the type of penalty imposed. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A
Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235 (1971) (penalty for civil contempt coercive compelling
obedience to court order; criminal contempt penalties vindicate authority of court). The next
category to determine is whether the contempt is direct or constructive, based on where the
contemptuous conduct took place. See id. at 221-24 (direct contempt occurs before court,
whereas constructive contempt takes place outside court's presence). Finally, there must be a
determination as to whether the contempt is petty or serious, requiring a jury trial. See Note,
Aggregating Indirect CriminalContempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial. 20 WAYNE L. REV.
891, 895 (1974) (determination of seriousness of offense based on legislative penalty, not actual
penalty imposed by court).
17. See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 187 (1958) (neither art. III nor sixth
amendment require criminal contempts to be tried by jury); Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441 (1911) (civil contempt results in remedial or coercive punishment while
criminal contempt vindicates court's authority by making sentence punitive in nature); see also
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 235 (1971) (if contempt is
criminal, constitutional safeguards for criminal trials apply; if civil, they do not).
18. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201 (1968). After reconsidering its earlier position that criminal contempt could be tried without a jury, the Supreme Court concluded that
criminal contempt is like any other crime because it is punishable by imprisonment, fines or
both. See id. at 201. Because of this shift in focus, the Court concluded that the same considerations that make a jury trial fundamental in criminal cases should be applied to criminal
contempt proceedings. See id. at 202; see also Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use
of the Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 1008 (1975)
(Bloom rejected previous Supreme Court decisions in adopting six-month rule as boundary for
petty offenses).
19. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (seriousness of contempt determined
by objective standards); Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 231
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serious, the Court applied an objective test which first looked to the maximum legislative penalty authorized,2" then to the sentence actually imposed,
if the legislature had failed to set a maximum penalty. 21 Later Supreme
Court opinions adopted a prison sentence of more than six months as the
"demarcation" between petty and serious contempt violations. 22 These objective criteria have been utilized by courts for determining whether criminal
contempt punished by imprisonment was serious enough to warrant a trial
by jury.23

Criminal contempt may be punished by the imposition of fines, as well as

(1971) (Bloom court adopted aggregation rule for petty offenses where no jury would be required); see also Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial
by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 623 (1973) (Bloom opinion did not determine length of sentence
needed to become serious, but only held two year sentence was serious enough to require
protection of jury trial).
20. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (courts should look first to penalty
authorized by legislature to determine if offense serious or petty); see also Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (legislatively authorized penalty of major importance in determination of whether sixth amendment rights will apply). See generally Thompson & Starkman,
Multiple Petty Contempts and Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 631 (1973) (Bloom
court balanced policy considerations in extending jury trial to contempt proceedings).
21. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (courts should only look to fine actually imposed if legislature has not expressed judgment as to seriousness of offense). See generally Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts and Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 61
GEO. L.J. 621, 631 (1973) (Bloom court struggled with conflicting policy considerations before
concluding jury trial extends to contempt).
22. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) (fixed dividing line between
petty and serious offenses as prison sentence of more than six months); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (no offense petty that carries authorized prison sentence of more than
six months); see also Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt
Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 1005-08 (1975) (detailed history and analysis of Supreme Court's development of six month rule). Adoption of the six month rule as the
dividing line between serious and petty offenses has been criticized by several Supreme Court
Justices, as well as legal commentators. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970)
(Douglas, J., and Black, J., concurring) (arbitrariness of six month rule not based on clear
language of Constitution but upon "judicial mutilation"); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S.
373, 384-86 (1966) (Douglas, J., and Black, J., dissenting) (rejected six month rule as sole
indicator of seriousness of contempt); see also Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the
Confusion Between Civil and CriminalContempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 683-84 (1981) (trial
judge should determine whether contempt serious or petty so safeguards applied at beginning
of proceeding to avoid having case reversed on appeal).
23. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1968) (extending jury trial right to serious contempt offenses by use of objective criteria based on same considerations used to justify
jury trials in criminal cases); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (objective criteria
such as existing statutory laws should be referred to in determining whether punishment authorized necessitates trial by jury). But see Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts
and the Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 627 (1973) (Bloom abandoned traditional view that jury trials impermissible in cases of contempt by interpreting sixth amendment
in light of modem considerations).
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prison sentences.2 4 While the six month standard applies to prison
sentences, the United States Supreme Court has not adopted a similar objective standard when a fine is imposed.25 In Muniz v. Hoffman,2 6 the Supreme
Court considered when an imposed fine becomes serious enough for a jury
trial, but declined to set any definitive guidelines. 27 Instead, the Court examined the financial resources of the contemnor involved and held that the
imposition of a $10,000 fine on a large labor union was not a serious offense. 28 Later courts interpreting the Muniz rationale have concluded that a

subjective test of analyzing the contemnor's ability to pay was implicitly
applied. 29

24. See, e.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475 (1975) (Supreme Court recognized
issue when fine imposed for criminal contempt becomes serious one of first impression for
Court); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (recognizing federal statute defines
petty offenses as punishable by less than six month prison sentence and/or $500 fine); United
States v. Troxler Hosiery, 681 F.2d 934, 937-38 (10th Cir. 1982) (contempt fine of $80,000
depriving manufacturer of illegally obtained profits warranted); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)
(1983) (petty offense is crime punishable by less than six months imprisonment and by fine of
$500 or less). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183,
231 (1971) (although sanctions for contempt vary, imprisonment and fines are most common).
25. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975) (issue of when contempt fine
becomes serious enough to warrant jury trial unresolved); see also United States v. Hamdan,
552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977) (adopting $500 federal statutory limit as boundary for serious criminal contempt until Supreme Court provides clearer guidance). For an extensive list
of cases discussing the difficulty of setting definite guidelines when fines are imposed for criminal contempt, see Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 900 n. 42 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
26. 422 U.S. 454 (1975).
27. See id. at 476. The Court noted previous Supreme Court decisions relied on 18
U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983) to help determine the boundary between petty and serious offenses, but
stated the federal statute has no "talismanic significance" when a fine is imposed. See id. at
476-77; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983) (serious offense is one with authorized imprisonment
of six months or more and fine of $500 or more). Because of the intrinsic difference between
fines and imprisonment, the Court declined to set a standard for fines as it had for prison
sentences. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975) (prison sentence will always be
serious, but amount of fine and its impact will vary with contemnor).
28. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (fine imposed on large labor union
not serious enough to require jury to avoid bias considering defendant's financial ability to pay
fine).
29. See United States v. Troxler Hosiery, 681 F.2d 934, 937 (4th Cir. 1982) (fine of
$80,000 against sleepware manufacturer to deprive company of any profits made in violation of
court injunction not serious offense because of defendant's ability to pay fine); Musidor v.
Great Am. Screen, 658 F.2d 60, 66 (2nd Cir. 1981) ($10,000 fine against corporation guilty of
criminal contempt does not require jury trial because amount of fine is petty when compared
to defendant's ability to pay). Three other courts, however, have rejected the use of a subjective approach when a fine for criminal contempt is imposed against an individual, adopting
instead the objective guidelines set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983) (misdemeanors with authorized penalties not exceeding six months or fine of $500 or less considered petty offenses).
See, e.g., United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (bothersome issues
would be raised by requiring trial court to consider individual's financial status when imposing
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The determination of whether a criminal contempt sentence is petty or
serious is further complicated when fines or prison sentences are imposed
simultaneously for multiple contempt violations.3" The United States
Supreme Court has required multiple post-trial prison sentences to be aggregated to determine whether a jury trial was necessary. 31 The contempt violation in the Codispoti case, however, occurred in the presence of the trial
judge, necessarily restricting the ruling to direct criminal contempts, as distinguished from indirect or constructive contempt, which occurs outside the
presence of the court.3 2 The rationale behind the aggregation rule was to
prevent arbitrary judicial conduct when deciding direct contemptuous acts
after the trial, ensuring the defendant would have a trial by jury to hear the
contempt allegations by aggregating the multiple sentences.3 3 The United
fines, thus basing constitutional rights on personal wealth); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d
276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting Muniz subjective standard of "seriousness of risk and extent
of possible deprivation" because potential for unpredictable and nonuniform judgments would
be great); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting Muniz
standard as inapplicable to individual contemnors because fines have greater impact on individuals than corporations).
30. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 1972) (consecutive direct contempt sentences imposed after trial should be aggregated to determine right to jury trial, but
little guidance in this area). But see In re Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild Local 225, 476 F.2d
856, 859-60 (1st Cir. 1973) (Seale aggregation rule inapplicable to multiple indirect criminal
contempts); see also Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary Contempt
Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 1009 (1975) (six month guideline for serious
contempt has potential for abuse through use of multiple short-term sentences served
consecutively).
31. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515 (1974) (contemnor's due process
rights require multiple sentences be aggregated when trial judge waits until after trial to punish
direct contempts occurring during trial); United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356 (7th Cir.
1972) (aggregation rule only applies to post-trial sentencing of direct contempts, not to punishment imposed immediately after contempt occurs). But see Thompson & Starkman, Multiple
Petty Contempts and Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 649-50 (1973) (basic premise of Seale decision improper because mere potential for abuse when imposing separate contempt sentences not sufficient to deny power).
32. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (contemnors punished for
direct contempt by multiple consecutive rather than concurrent sentences); see also, R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 68-69 (1963) (direct contempts are committed within presence
of the court and may be punished summarily; indirect contempts occur outside court's presence and require that different procedure be followed). An example of direct contempt is a
witness' refusal to answer questions when the court orders him to do so during the trial. See
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 224 (1971) (direct contempt
occurs before trial judge; indirect contempt violates court's authority). Indirect or constructive contempt occurs when a judicial order such as an injunction is violated, entitling the party
charged to a hearing. See id. at 224.
33. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 507 (1974) (defendant tried for direct
contemptuous conduct during his criminal trial). But see In re Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild
Local 225, 476 F.2d 856, 859 (1st Cir. 1973) (aggregation rule for direct contempts inapplicable to indirect contempts occurring outside presence of courtroom because possibility for judi-
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States Supreme Court, however, has not yet addressed the issue of multiple
prison sentences or fines for criminal contempt violations that are indirect.3 4
The Supreme Court of Texas, however, has addressed the issue of when
multiple indirect contemptuous fines are serious enough to warrant a jury
trial.3 5 In Ex parte Werblud,36 the contemnor was convicted of two separate
acts of indirect criminal contempt, and fined $500 for each violation.3 7 The
court recognized that petty contempt offenses are defined statutorily in
Texas.3" The Supreme Court of Texas held that the imposition of more than
one fine does not automatically take the criminal contempt offense out of the
petty category, because the United States Supreme Court has expressly refused to set definite guidelines in determining when contempt fines become
serious.3 9 The court, in effect, looked at the two imposed fines separately,

cial abuse greatly reduced). See generally Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study on the Use of
the Summary Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 1025 (1975)
(Supreme Court's distinction between when sentence is imposed for direct contempt illogical
and not justified by need of courtroom control).
34. Compare Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminatingthe Confusion between Civil and
Criminal Contempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 679-80 (1981) (Supreme Court has yet to resolve
relationship between indirect contempt sanction imposed and correct procedure to follow
when imposing it) with Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 220
(1971) (indirect contempt proceedings relatively safe because dangers of abuse involved with
direct contempts not present).
35. See Exparte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (two $500 fines not necessarily serious offenses when looked at separately instead of aggregated); Ex parte Genecov, 143
Tex. 476, 480, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226-27 (1945) (contempt violations quasi-criminal in nature
and should follow criminal procedure as much as possible; multiple violations may be punished in single proceeding). See generally Thompson & Sparkman, Multiple Petty Contempts
and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 621, 639-40 (1973) (every separate criminal
violation merits separate punishment; same rule should apply to contempt actions since criminal in nature).
36. 536 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. 1976).
37. See id. at 544. Werblud refused to pay the imposed fines, was taken into custody, and
filed a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release, alleging he was denied his constitutional
right to jury trial. See id. at 544; see also Note, Contempt - Right to Jury Trial, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 865, 876 (1974) (indirect contempt sentences should be aggregated to determine contemnor's right to trial by jury).
38. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (Texas statute for criminal
contempt within same limits as federal statute and United States Supreme Court decisions);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 191 la, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The first section of the
statute authorizes courts to punish for contempt. Id. § 1. The text of § 2(a) reads as follows:
"Every court... may punish by a fine of not more than $500, or by confinement in the county
jail for not more than six months, or both, any person guilty of contempt of the court." Id. § 2
(a); see also Greenhill, Proposed New Statute on Contempt, 33 TEX. B.J. 970, 971 (1970) (legislative history of contempt statute indicates drafters were defining petty offense category, for
which no right to jury trial attaches).
39. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (Muniz warns that $500 limit
does not set boundary for determination of serious offenses even if two fines viewed as one
penalty); see also James v. Headly, 410 F.2d 325, 329 (5th Cir. 1969) (petty sentences should
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comparing each one to the objective criteria established by the Texas statute.' Since each fine was within the statutory limits,4 1 the amount of the
fines did not take the contempt out of the petty offense category, and could
be tried without a jury.4 2
In Ex parte Griffin,4 3 a habeas corpus proceeding," the Supreme Court of
Texas discharged the relator from custody because he was sentenced for constructive criminal contempt without the protection of a jury.4 5 The court
held that the multiple contemptuous acts constituted a serious offense,
thereby requiring a jury trial because the total amount of the separate fines
was unusually large.46 The Griffin court applied the Muniz subjective test4 7
to determine the seriousness of the risk the contemnor faced and the extent
not be aggregated to determine right to jury trial). See generally Thompson & Starkman,
Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 637 (1973)
(issue left open after Bloom is whether multiple acts of contempt warranting nominal penalties
should be aggregated to determine if jury trial necessary).
40. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (Muniz held amount over
$500 does not automatically make offense serious even if fines were result of one offense). The
court recognized and upheld its previous holding made over 30 years before, that it is permissible to punish two separate acts of constructive or indirect contempt in one proceeding. See id.
at 547; see also Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 480, 186 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1945) (indirect
criminal contempt similar to misdemeanor, and both should be treated same by allowing multiple offenses to be charged in same indictment and decided in one proceeding). Since the
Genecov opinion, however, procedural changes made by the Texas Legislature now require
separate indictments for each misdemeanor charge, but the courts have still followed the
Genecov rationale. See Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 210 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (would be needless formalism to require same procedure for multiple contempt charges as now required for misdemeanors, as long as contemnor clearly informed of all charges against him).
41. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 191 la, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (contempt may
be punished by fine of $500 or less, or imprisonment for six months or less in county jail).
42. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (two separate fines of $500
each do not take offenses out of petty category); see also In re Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild
Local 225, 476 F.2d 856, 859 (1st Cir. 1973) (indirect criminal contempts resulting in multiple
fines should be looked at separately, not aggregated, to determine if jury trial necessary). But
see Note, AggregatingIndirectCriminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial, 20 WAYNE
L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (Newspaper Guild court incorrectly decided to look at multiple contempts separately when they should be aggregated to determine right to jury trial to protect
defendant's right from judicial abuse). See generally Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty
Contempts and the Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 646-47 (1973) (noting many
courts have held multiple petty sentences should not be aggregated to determine right to jury
trial in non-contempt cases; same reasoning applicable to contempt situations).
43. 682 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. 1984).
44. See id. at 261 (Griffin was sentenced to thirty days in jail, bringing present habeas
corpus proceeding seeking his release).
45. See id. at 261 (judgment void as amount of fines too large without jury trial).
46. See id. at 262 (aggregate amount of 208 fines too serious to impose without jury trial).
47. See id. at 262 (excessive amount of fines too large for any individual to pay without
having protection of jury trial); see also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475 (1975) (court
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of probable financial deprivation.48 The Supreme Court of Texas held that
the aggregate amount of the fines was too large to impose without the protection of a jury trial.4 9 The Griffin majority noted that other courts have
adopted $500 as the line between petty and serious offenses.5 ° The concurring opinion by Justice Robertson argued that contempt proceedings are
quasi-criminal in nature, 51 protected by procedural due process standards
and not sixth amendment rights as the majority held.52
The dissent asserted that Griffin's writ of habeas corpus should have been
denied because he failed to establish a right to a jury trial.53 After distinguishing civil and criminal contempt,5 4 the dissent noted that although a
bright line standard has been set by the United States Supreme Court for
prison sentences,55 no comparable standard has been set when fines are im-

should apply subjective test of looking at defendant's ability to pay imposed fine to determine if
offense serious enough to require jury).
48. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fine of $104,000 too
great hardship to impose without jury trial protection) with Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454,
476 (1975) ($10,000 fine not serious enough deprivation for large labor union to require protection of jury trial).
49. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (jury trial necessary when
$104,000 fine imposed on individual) with id. at 263 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (application of
Muniz subjective standard to facts of instant case show contemnor does not deserve trial by
jury). But see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (determination of seriousness of
offense should be made by referring to objective criteria, such as existing national or state
laws).
50. See Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (using other courts' adoption of
$500 limit to support result reached). To support its conclusion the court cited the following
cases, see United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977) (realistic to assume fine
of more than $500 would be serious to all individuals; accepting federal statutory definition of
petty offenses); Richmond Black Officers Police Ass'n v. Richmond, 548 F.2d 123, 125-28 (4th
Cir. 1977) ($250 fine assessed against each of four defendants was petty offense not requiring
trial by jury); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ($5,000 fine
too large to impose on individual, when compared to federal statute, without benefit of jury).
51. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J., concurring)
(fifth amendment due process standards apply instead of sixth amendment right to jury trial
because contempt quasi-criminal in nature).
52. See id. at 263 (Robertson, J., concurring) (sixth amendment rights should not be
available in contempt proceedings).
53. See id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (constitutional right to jury trial not shown by
relator when fines imposed for multiple contempts).
54. See id. at 263 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (criminal contempt concerned with punishing
past violations affronting authority of court).
55. See id. at 263 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (serious offense is one carrying excess of six
month imprisonment); see also Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475-76 (1975) (criminal contempt does not, in and of itself, warrant jury trial unless it carries with it sentence of more than
six month imprisonment).
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posed.5 6 The dissent accepted that the Muniz subjective standard required
courts to determine the contemnor's financial ability to pay the fine before
declaring the offense to be serious enough to require a trial by jury.5 7 The
dissent concluded, however, that Griffin could afford to pay the fines, so no
jury trial was required."8
The majority of the Supreme Court of Texas explicitly applied the Muniz
subjective standard59 by looking at the contemnor's financial ability to pay
the imposed fines to determine if the offense was serious enough to warrant a
jury trial. 6° In applying the Muniz subjective standard, however, the Griffin
court did not consider crucial fact differences between the two cases.61 In
Muniz, the contemnor was a large labor union who violated a temporary

56. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1984) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(harder to determine if contempt serious, warranting jury trial, when fine imposed).
57. See id. at 263-64 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (Griffin's ability to pay fine enhanced by
profits made in violation of temporary injunction, reducing imposed fine to net effect of

$8,000).
58. See id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (Griffin knowingly violated court orders and
personally profited from prohibited sales, thereby precluding jury trial).
59. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (imposed fines too large
for anyone to pay without protection of jury trial) with Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476
(1975) (corporate contemnor denied right to jury trial because fine not substantial enough for
particular defendant to require jury trial). But see, e.g., Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211
(1968) (courts should first look to objective standard of legislative judgment to determine seriousness of offense, then to actual penalty imposed if legislature has failed to express judgment);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968) (should refer to existing laws and practices
surrounding offense in question so determination of how serious offense is will be based on
objective criteria); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (application of
Muniz subjective standard offers inadequate guidelines in determination of seriousness of offense involved).
60. See Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (individual contemnor's ability
to pay fine important in determination of seriousness of offense). Previous United States
Supreme Court decisions, however, have established the rule that jury trials apply only to
serious cases, not whether the accused can afford to pay the imposed fine. See, e.g., Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72 (1970) (jury protects accused from government abuse only when
charge serious); Cheff v. Schackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (prosecution of petty offense
does not require jury trial, only required for serious offenses); District of Columbia v. Clawans,
300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937) (right to jury trial does not apply to every criminal proceeding, as
petty offenses commonly tried summarily). See generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 981
(1926) (detailed analysis and historical review of basis for petty offense exception to jury trials).
61. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (large fine of $104,000 too
serious for individual contemnor to pay without protection of jury trial) with Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975) (corporate contemnor denied right to jury trial because imposed
fine of $10,000 not serious enough for that particular defendant). Lower courts have interpretated the holding of Muniz to be applicable only to corporations, not individual contemnors.
See United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz subjective criteria
should only be applied to corporate, not individual contemnors); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ($5,000 fine imposed on individual contemnor too
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injunction and was fined $10,000 for one act of constructive criminal con-

tempt.6 2 In contrast, Griffin involved numerous violations of a temporary
injunction by an individual, resulting in a $500 fine for each separate violation. 63 The Griffin majority failed to note that the Muniz subjective test has
been rejected by other courts in cases involving an individual contemnor, 64
yet the majority cites to two of those very cases to support their analysis and
result.6 5 While the Griffin dissent recognized that the Muniz standard has
not been applied to individual contemnors,6 6 it too disregards these decisions

large to be decided without jury trial based on objective statute rather than subjective Muniz

criteria).
62. See Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (labor union of 13,000 members can
pay $10,000 contempt fine without imposition of jury to prevent bias). The Muniz court referred to the federal statutory definition of petty offenses set out in 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983), but
warned it has no "talismanic significance". See id. at 476-77. The Muniz court reaffirmed that
a serious offense is one that results in more than a six month prison sentence, but refused to
adopt the $500 limit for petty offenses also included in the federal statute. See id. at 476-77.
The court applied a subjective test of looking at the corporate contemnor's financial ability to
pay the fine as being determinative of whether the offense was serious enough to warrant the
protection of a jury trial. See id. at 476-77.
63. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fines of $500 each for 208
separate violations, totaling $104,000 too serious to impose without jury). But see Ex parte
Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (punishment of multiple contempt violations by
fine does not automatically become serious offense because total amount of fines more than
$500); Exparte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 481, 186 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1945) (fines of $50 imposed
for each of 30 contempt violations within statutory guidelines not requiring trial by jury). See
generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 234 (1971) (determination of seriousness of offense more difficult when multiple sentences for contempt combined
in one proceeding).
64. See, e.g., United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz subjective standard of considering contemnor's financial status raises many troubling issues because it bases constitutional rights on personal wealth instead of more reliable objective
criteria); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting subjective
Muniz standard because potential for unpredictable and inconsistent judgments would be
great); Douglass v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting Muniz
standard as inapplicable to individual contemnors because fines have greater impact on individuals than corporations); see also Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 679-80 (1981) (Supreme Court
has yet to resolve relationship between indirect contempt sanction imposed and correct procedure to follow when imposing it).
65. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (citing United States v.
Hamdan and Douglass v. FirstNat'l Realty in support of holding right to jury trial exists where
potential fine exceeds $500).
66. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1984) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(Muniz subjective test has never been applied to individual contemnors, but should be in present case). But see United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz
subjective standard of considering individual contemnor's financial status raises more troublesome issues than objective standard). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56
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and applies the Muniz subjective test to the facts of the -instant case.6 7 The
irony of the Griffin majority's reliance on Hamdan and Douglass is that
those courts adopted the federal statute as the only objective criteria possible
when fines are imposed for criminal contempt until the United States
Supreme Court supplied additional guidance.6 8 The Griffin majority did not
acknowledge the objective rationale used by the Hamdan and Douglass
courts, but instead applied their own subjective judgment in an area that the
United States Supreme Court expressly left open to question. 69 Thus, both
the Griffin majority and dissent applied the subjective Muniz test, but each
reached opposite results. 7' The Griffin majority held that the excessive
amount of the imposed fines made the offenses serious enough to require a
jury trial, while the dissent would have denied Griffin that right based on his
financial ability to pay the imposed fines. 7 1 These inconsistent results indi-

CORNELL L. REV. 183, 233 (1971) (difficult questions raised in determination of when penalty
for contempt becomes serious enough to warrant jury trial).
67. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. 1984) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(Muniz rationale seems to require analyzing individual contemnor's ability to pay imposed fine
as step in determination of whether offense serious enough to require trial by jury). But see
Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975) (subjective criteria of determining extent of risk
corporate contemnor faces important consideration because fines and imprisonment inherently
different for individuals as opposed to corporations); United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772,
774-75 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz does not require case-by-case analysis of individual's financial
ability to pay imposed fine in determination of how serious an offense is involved); United
States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (subjective standard of Muniz not meant
to apply to individual contemnors because would require trial and appellate judges to rely on
their own personal experience and judgment in determining seriousness of risk involved).
68. See United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1977) (uniformity, objectivity and judicial efficiency will be encouraged by accepting statutory definition of petty offense
as objective standard for determination of right to jury trial when fines imposed); Douglass v.
First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (important to refer to objective criteria
such as federal statute to determine reliable standard to apply to contempt cases).
69. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fine of $104,000 too
serious an offense to not warrant jury trial) with United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 27980 (9th Cir. 1977) (right to jury trial should depend on objective standards, not subjective
judgment of particular trial or appellate judge). See generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER 48 (1963) (determination of seriousness of contempt as reasonable as "Russian roulette" with as many tragic results).
70. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fine as large as $104,000
would be serious risk to any individual without jury trial) with id. at 263-64 (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (Griffin made profits of $96,000 from prohibited sales, thus reducing net effect of
$104,000 fine to only $8,000, which is not serious offense considering contemnor's willful violation of court order). But see United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980)
(constitutional right to jury trial should not be conditioned on basis of individual's financial
wealth or lack thereof); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (potential
for unpredictable and inconsistent judgments would be just as great even if subjective Muniz
test limited solely to financial considerations of individual contemnor).
71. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (total fine of $104,000 too
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cate the dangers of using a subjective test in situations involving individual
contemnor's, and suggests that an alternative approach should have been
followed. 2
One alternative the Griffin court could have followed is the objective test
set forth in previous United States Supreme Court decisions." The objective
approach requires a determination of the maximum penalty authorized by
the legislature for the particular offense involved, followed by consideration
of the penalty actually imposed if the legislature has been silent as to the
seriousness of the offense.74 In Texas, the applicable statute for contempt
defines a petty criminal contempt as a fine of $500 or less, and six months or
less in prison.7 5 Previous Texas Supreme Court cases recognized the utility
of referring to the applicable statutory standard to determine the seriousness
of the contempt violation.76 The Griffin court was faced with a similar fact

serious an offense not to be tried before jury) with id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (contemnor's financial ability to pay imposed fines made contempt petty offense, thereby precluding
jury trial).
72. See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 247 (1971) (suggesting adoption of statute requiring trial judge to define at beginning of proceeding what type
of contempt involved so appropriate procedures may be followed); Martineau, Contempt of
Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 CINN. L. REV.
677, 684 (1981) (too many contempt sentences reversed on appeal because of circular reasoning used to determine if jury trial should have been granted based on final result of
proceeding).
73. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (courts should focus on
objective criteria such as existing laws to determine seriousness of offense); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (penalty authorized for crime in question crucial to determine
whether serious enough to require sixth amendment safeguards); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (courts should look to penalty authorized by law-making
body as indication of its social judgment). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey,
56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 233 (1971) (difficult questions raised in determination of when
sentence for contempt no longer petty).
74. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (objective standard of looking to penalty actually imposed will determine if jury trial warranted when legislature silent as to seriousness of offense); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379 (1966) (relying on objective
criteria set by federal statute to support holding that six month prison sentence not serious).
But see Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury,
61 GEO. L.J. 621, 621 (1973) (Bloom decision left open question of how to treat multiple
contempt violations to determine their seriousness).
75. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 191 la, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985). The equivalent
federal statute defines a petty offense to be any misdemeanor that carries a fine of less than
$500 or six month prison sentence, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1983). But see Muniz v.
Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 477 (1975) (federal contempt statute does not automatically apply to
fines as it does to prison sentences).
76. See Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (federal and Texas contempt
statutes both provide important objective criteria in determining whether two fines of $500
each remain in petty offense category); Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 479, 186 S.W.2d 225,
226-27 (1945) (courts may punish multiple contempt violations in same proceeding, imposing
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pattern, but the Griffin opinion did not expressly adhere to the earlier precedents. 77 According to Werblud and Genecov, the facts of the instant case
would not merit a jury trial because the trial court fined Griffin $500 for
each separate offense, thus remaining within the objective boundaries set
forth by the Texas Legislature.7 8 Both the Griffin majority and dissent, however, relied on their own subjective judgment in the determination of how
serious the fine was for this particular defendant. 79 By abandoning the direction of Werblud, Genecov, and analogous United States Supreme Court
cases, the Griffin court failed to adhere to the objective criteria previously
advocated.80

maximum allowable penalty for each contempt). Neither the majority nor dissent followed
this previous analytical approach in deciding the instant case. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682
S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (total amount of fines imposed for multiple contempt makes
offense serious) with id. at 263-64 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (total amount of fine not serious
when court considers contemnor's ability to pay fine out of profits made from prohibited sales).
See generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 43 (1963) (determination of type of
contempt crucial to contemnor's constitutional rights, such as right to jury trial); Thompson &
Starkman, Multiple Contempts and the Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 631
(1973) (contempt power compels obedience to judicial orders so public will believe judgments
enforced).
77. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (Werblud held two $500
fines were not serious, but instant case presents extreme fact situation) with id. at 263 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (Werblud referred to statutory criteria to determine seriousness of contempt,
but Muniz subjective criteria should be followed instead).
78. See Ex parte Werblud, 526 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (separate fines of $500 each
within statutory definition of petty offense, even if looked at as one offense by aggregating
totals); Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 479, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226 (1945) (separate contempt
offenses may be punished in same proceeding, as long as contemnor adequately notified of
charges against him).
79. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fine of $104,000 too large
for individual contemnor to pay without jury trial protection) with id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J.,
dissenting) (imposed fine not serious enough for jury trial when court considers profits made
by contemnor). But see, e.g., United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980)
(bothersome issues raised by requiring trial court to consider individual's financial status when
imposing fines, thus basing constitutional rights on personal wealth); United States v. Hamdan,
552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejecting subjective standard of seriousness of risk and
deprivation because potential for unpredictable and non-uniform judgments great); Douglass
v. First Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting Muniz subjective standard
as inapplicable to individual contemnors because fines have much greater impact on individuals than corporations); see also Comment, Contempt of Court in Texas, 14 S. TEX. L.J. 278,
279 (1973) (criminal contempt limited to maximum penalty authorized by statute, but may
result in consecutive sentences if series of contemptuous acts occur).
80. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (authorized penalty determines
whether sixth amendment safeguards are invoked for crime in question); District of Columbia
v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (legislative penalty authorized indicates seriousness of
crime); United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz subjective standard not meant to apply to individuals because to do so would be basing constitutional rights
on individual wealth, which Constitution does not do). Compare Ex parte Werblud, 536
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A secondary issue which the Griffin opinion did not address is whether
separate fines imposed for a series of constructive criminal contempts should
be considered separately or aggregated to determine if a jury trial is necessary."1 The Griffin decision did not follow Texas precedent by aggregating
the total amount of fines imposed on Griffin to determine his right to a jury
trial.8 2 The previous decisions, however, can be distinguished from the facts
of the instant case. 3 In both Werblud and Genecov, the individual contemnors were fined for a relatively minimal number of violations, when compared to the large number of fines imposed on Griffin. 84 Thus, the Griffin

S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (even though two fines were imposed, offense still petty because
each fine within statutory definition of petty contempt) with Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261,
262 (Tex. 1984) (fines totaling $104,000 too large for individual contemnor to pay without jury
determination); see also Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 479, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226 (1945)
(fines imposed for 30 separate violations permissible because each fine within statutory defintion of petty offense); Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial
by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 621 (1973) (United States Supreme Court has not resolved issue of
jury trial in cases of multiple, petty contempts which become serious when aggregated).
81. See Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (implicitly holding that aggregate amount of fines determine right to jury trial); see id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(contemnor not entitled to jury trial considering net fine imposed). But see Note, Aggregating
Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902
(1974) (courts can abuse power to punish for indirect contempt, thus compelling aggregation
of multiple fines to protect against arbitrary judicial conduct).
82. Compare Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (separate fines of $500
each not serious enough to warrant jury trial) with Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex.
1984) (total amount of 208 separate fines too excessive to impose without jury trial) and id. at
263-64 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (net fine imposed not serious when contemnor's ability to pay
considered). But see Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 480, 186 S.W.2d 225, 227 (1945) (contempt offense analogous to misdemeanors, thus both may be regarded separately to determine
if petty or serious); see also Note, Contempt - Right to Jury Trial, 87 HARV. L. REV. 865, 871
(1974) (aggregation of multiple indirect criminal contempt sentences will protect defendant
from judicial abuse more times than not). See generally Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty
Contempts and the Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 639 (1973) (multiple contempt violations deserve same analysis to determine if jury trial necessary, because non-continuous criminal violations deserve separate penalties).
83. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (contemnor fined for 208
separate violations resulting in total fine of $104,000) with Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542,
547 (Tex. 1976) (individual contemnor fined $500 each for two separate acts of indirect criminal contempt); see also Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 480, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226 (1945)
(contemnor fined $50 each for thirty distinct violations). See generally Thompson &
Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 624
(1973) (United States Supreme Court has not considered whether contemnor who commits
multiple violations, each resulting in petty sentence, deserves trial by jury).
84. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (contemnor fined $500
each for 208 violations of temporary injunction) with Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547
(Tex. 1976) (two $500 fines not serious offense requiring jury trial, either when aggregated or
considered separately); see also Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 480, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226
(1945) (separate fines of $50 each imposed for 30 separate violations still petty offense). See
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court was faced with an extreme situation demanding a new approach to
reach an equitable result."5 By aggregating the fines imposed by the trial
court, the Griffin opinion implicitly adopted the same policy reasons espoused by the United States Supreme Court in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania.8 6
The Codispoti Court held that judicial efficiency must give way to sixth
amendment rights when a post-trial sentence is imposed, because there is no
longer a need to have immediate power and control over the courtroom as
there is during the course of a trial.8 7 Although the Codispoti aggregation
rule is limited by its facts to direct criminal contempts punished by imprisonment,8 8 the rationale of the decision is analogous to indirect criminal contempts punishable by a series of fines.8 9 Many legal commentators have
noted that both direct and indirect contempts are subject to similar dangers,

generally Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (considerations of judicial efficiency must give way to constitutional safeguards such as trial by jury when individual rights at stake).
85. See In re Puerto Rico Newspaper Guild Local 225, 476 F.2d 856, 859-60 (1st Cir.
1973) (aggregation rule should not be applied to cases of indirect criminal contempt unless
exceptional circumstances exist). But see Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of
Court - Right to Jury Trial, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 898 (1974) (both direct and indirect
contempt power susceptible to judicial abuse, requiring multiple fines be aggregated in both
situations to determine right to jury trial).
86. Compare Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515 (1974) (multiple post-trial
sentences for direct contempt should be aggregated to require jury trial to protect defendant
from government oppression) with Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (amount
of 208 fines totaling $104,000 too large for individual contemnor to pay without protection of
jury trial). See generally Note, Taylor v. Hayes: A Case Study in the Use of the Summary
Contempt Power Against the Trial Attorney, 63 Ky. L.J. 945, 1016 (1975) (Codispoti court
adopted aggregation rule to prevent judicial abuse and arbitrary conduct by imposing right to
jury trial in most cases of multiple penalties).
87. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 515-16 (1974) (post-trial sentencing of
direct contempt requires aggregation of all multiple penalties imposed because individual defendant's constitutional rights more important than need to maintain order in courtroom);
United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 1972) (potential for abuse of summary
contempt power greater when used after trial than if imposed immediately after contempt
occurs). But see Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury
Trial, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (indirect contempt subject to subtle misuse through
imposition of multiple penalties, each within statutory minimum, compelling protection of
contemnor from such abuse by aggregation of all fines imposed).
88. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (aggregation of multiple fines
limited to punishment of direct contempt). See generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT
POWER 68 (1963) (direct contempts are committed within the presence of court and may not
be punished summarily, while indirect contempts occur outside courtroom, requiring different
procedures be followed).
89. See Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial,
20 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (indirect contempt subject to subtle judicial misuse, compelling individual be protected by aggregation of multiple fines); see also Note, Contempt Right to Jury Trial, 87 HARV. L. REV. 865, 869 (1974) (punishment for indirect contempts
occur at separate hearing, making imposition of jury less burdensome than for direct con-
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such as subtle judicial misuse, which justifies aggregation of multiple penalities to ensure the protection of a jury trial. 9° Thus, the Griffin decision implicitly applied the Codispoti aggregation rule, thereby rejecting the Court's
previous non-aggregation approach to multiple fines. 9 The explanation for
the opposite results reached by the majority and dissent, however, lies in
their reliance on the Muniz subjective test, rather than in an application of
the Codispoti aggregation rule.92 The Griffin majority in essence substituted
its own judgment of when multiple fines became serious, while the dissent
analyzed the contemnor's financial ability to pay the imposed fines to reach a
contrary result. 93 If the court had applied only the Codispoti aggregation

rule the same result would occur but without the difficulties of the subjective
Muniz approach evidenced in both the majority and dissent in Griffin.
The unique situation presented to the Supreme Court of Texas in Ex parte
Griffin required a careful review of the historical background surrounding

tempts, thus strengthening argument for aggregation of multiple fines imposed for indirect
contemptuous act).
90. See Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by
Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 649-50 (1973) (judicial power to impose multiple contempt fines or
sentences subject to abuse); Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right
to Jury Trial, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (multiple fines for indirect criminal contempt should be aggregated to determine right to jury trial, just as direct criminal contempts
treated, because judicial abuse great in both situations); see also Note, Contempt - Right to
Jury Trial, 87 HARV. L. REV. 865, 869 (1974) (protection of aggregation of penalties for direct
contempts imposed after trial should be extended to cases of multiple indirect contempts, because misuse of contempt power can occur in either situation).
91. Compare Exparte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 261 (Tex. 1984) (total fine of $104,000 too
serious to impose without protection of jury trial) with Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547
(Tex. 1976) (multiple fines should be looked at separately to determine right to jury trial); see
also Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. 1984) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (net fine not
serious enough to warrant jury trial).
92. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (contemnor entitled to
jury trial because amount of imposed fines serious offense) with id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (contemnor not entitled to jury trial because fines not serious when considering contemnor's ability to pay). See generally Note, Contempt - Right to Jury Trial, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 865, 866 n. 10 (1974) (courts should not subjectively interpret how serious fine is in light
of defendant's financial status because results in great uncertainty and wasteful litigation).
93. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (aggregate amount of
fines too large for anyone to pay without jury trial) with id. at 264 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting)
(net fine imposed not serious when considering profits made by contemnor from prohibited
sales, thus increasing his ability to pay fines). But see United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276,
279 (9th Cir. 1977) (application of subjective standard substitutes particular judge's own personal judgment concerning seriousness of risk for objective statutory guidelines); Ex parte
Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (objective statutory criteria used to determine seriousness of offense). See generally Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 684 (1981) (too many contempt
sentences reversed on appeal because of circular reasoning used to determine if jury trial
should have been granted based on final result of proceeding).
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the right to a jury trial in constructive criminal contempt situations. The
Griffin decision lacks such a comprehensive approach, and is content to apply conclusory reasoning, using a subjective test never before applied to individual contemnors to reach their result.94 The dissenting opinion by Justice
Gonzalez also applies subjective criteria to reach a result contrary to the
majority's. Past United States Supreme Court and Texas cases in this area
rely instead upon the objective criteria provided by relevant statutes before
determining the seriousness of the offense. 95 Policy reasons, such as predictability and uniformity of decisions, dictate adherence to the objective approach, even in cases involving multiple contempt violations.9 6 In Griffin,
however, the extreme number of contempt violations demanded deviation
from the stricter view of past decisions of the court. 97 In addressing the
94. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (multiple fines totaling
$104,000 too large to impose without jury trial) with Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476
(1975) (fines and imprisonment inherently different for individuals instead of corporations,
thus subjective criteria of contemnor's ability to pay fine only imposed on corporate defendants); see also United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774-75 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz does
not require case-by-case analysis of individual's financial ability to pay imposed fines because
would base constitutional rights on personal wealth); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276,
279 (9th Cir. 1977) (subjective Muniz standard inapplicable to individual contemnors because
requires trial and appellate judges to rely on their own personal experience in determining
whether jury trial necessary). See generally Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the
Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 CINN. L. REV. 677, 684 (1981) (appellate
courts frequently reverse contempt judgments because proper procedures not followed).
95. See, e.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969) (courts should focus on
objective criteria such as existing laws to determine seriousness of offense); Bloom v. Illinois,
391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (seriousness of contempt determined by objective standards); Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968) (legislatively authorized penalty of major importance in
determination of whether sixth amendment right of trial by jury applies); see also Ex parte
Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (federal and Texas contempt statutes both provide
important objective criteria in determining whether two fines of $500 each remain in petty
category); Exparte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 479, 186 S.W.2d 225, 226 (1945) (fines imposed for
30 separate violations permissible because each fine within statutory definition of petty offense). See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court.: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 233
(1971) (difficult questions raised in determining when judgment for contempt serious enough
to warrant jury trial).
96. See, e.g., United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (Muniz subjective criteria should only be applied to corporate, not individual contemnors to avoid basing
constitutional rights on individual wealth); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th
Cir. 1977) (practical benefits of efficiency, uniformnity and objectivity encouraged by applying
objective standards to determine when jury trial necessary for contempt offenses); Douglass v.
1st Nat'l Realty, 543 F.2d 894, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (objective criteria should be referred to as
providing most reliable indication of seriousness of contempt offense); see also Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 183, 234 (1971) (difficult to determine if contempt sentence petty or serious when multiple sentences combined in one proceeding). See
generally R. GOLDFARB, THE CONTEMPT POWER 48 (1963) (determination of seriousness of
contempt as risky as "Russian roulette").
97. Compare Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (fines imposed for 208
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issue of when fines become serious, the Griffin court chose the most lenient
approach possible, by combining the subjective Muniz test with aggregation
of the multiple fines. 98 Other courts have suggested a better approach would
be to apply the accepted objective test of comparing the applicable statute to
the aggregate amount of the multiple fines.9 9 Thus, the defendant's interests
would be protected from arbitrary judicial conduct by aggregating the fines,
while such policy goals as predictability and uniformity would be promoted
by use of the objective standard. The equities of the situation would be justly
resolved without sacrificing judicial integrity or efficiency. The Supreme
Court of Texas had an opportunity to clarify a confused area of the law in
Ex parte Griffin, but failed to establish reasonable guidelines for later courts
to follow. Unfortunately, the status of contempt in Texas will remain under
the present cloud of uncertainty and confusion until the Supreme Court of
Texas again has the opportunity to review multiple criminal contempt violations resulting in an excessive amount of fines.
Kathryn E. Eriksen

separate violations of temporary injunction makes offense serious enough to be tried before
jury) with Exparte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (two fines of $500 each remain
in petty category not requiring jury trial); see also Ex parte Genecov, 143 Tex. 476, 479, 186
S.W.2d 225, 226 (1945) (fines imposed for thirty separate violations permissible because each
fine within statutory definition of petty offense). See generally R. GOLDFARB, CONTEMPT OF
COURT 43 (1963) (determination of type of contempt crucial to contemnor's constitutional
rights such as right to trial by jury).
98. See Ex parte Griffin, 682 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. 1984) (imposition of 208 separate
fines aggregated and found to be serious enough to require jury trial). But see Ex parte Werblud, 536 S.W.2d 542, 547 (Tex. 1976) (two $500 fines are petty when looked at separately and
compared to objective statutory criteria). See generally Thompson & Starkman, Multiple Petty
Contempts and the Guaranteeof Trial by Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 621, 631 (1973) (extension of jury
trial right in contempt cases by United States Supreme Court requires practical considerations
be analyzed when implementing such right to unique contempt situations).
99. See United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980) (subjective criteria
raises bothersome issues because individual contemnor's constitutional rights based on his financial ability to pay fines); United States v. Hamdan, 552 F.2d 276, 279 (9th Cir. 1977)
(subjective standard inapplicable to individual contemnors because requires trial and appellate
judges to rely on their own personal experiences in determining seriousness of risk involved);
see also Note, Aggregating Indirect Criminal Contempts of Court - Right to Jury Trial, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 891, 902 (1974) (considerations of judicial efficiency must give way to constitutional safeguards, such as trial by jury when individual rights at stake).
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